The title of the discussion to which this paper is intended to contribute, 'Rationality, Learning, and Social Norms' spans a wider field of questions than I shall cover. I shall focus on one particular development in the recent economics literature, namely the development of a literature on learning and evolution. This literature is concerned with dynamic processes which describe how economic agents adjust their behaviour over time, and how, after agents have gained experience, their behaviour may become 'rational' in the economists' sense of this word. Several important academic journals have recently devoted special issues to this literature. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the contribution of this literature to economic theory.
I shall argue that the literature on learning and evolution has the potential to contribute substantially to our understanding of the economy. But I shall also criticise several aspects of the literature as it is currently developing. I shall suggest that the literature might benefit from a change of perspective. This change of perspective could in my opinion increase the impact of the literature on economic theory.
Much of this paper will be taken up by a discussion of the potential contribution of the literature on learning and evolution. For this, I shall need to place the literature in context. My starting point is that the literature provides an explanation of how ' rational' (in the economists' sense of the word) behaviour comes about. I shall begin in Section I with a discussion of the interpretation of the rationality hypothesis in economics. The interpretation which I shall favour, is that, the rationality hypothesis is a positive hypothesis about observable individual behaviour. In this interpretation the rationality hypothesis simply says that economic agents' behaviour can be interpreted as the solution to some optimisation problem. It does not say that this is because economic agents consciously solve optimisation problems^.
If the rationality hypothesis is interpreted in this way, it seems natural to ask next how well it does in practice. This will be discussed in Section II. I shall argue that the evidence is mixed. Economic agents typically act in some, but not in all situations rationally. This is shown both by experimental and by ' real world' evidence.
A
question which then arises is what distinguishes situations in which agents
• I am grateful to Murali Agastya, Ken Binmore, Antonio Cabrales and Christian Dustmann for very helpful discussions. I would also like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for financial support through research grant R000235526 and through the ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.
' Note that this is in the spirit of Friedman's (1953) proposal to judge economic models on the basis of their observable implications. behave rationally from those in which they do not. A central claim of this paper is that to find an answer to this question we need to do research on learning and evolution. This is because, to understand the distinction between situations in which agents do or do not behave rationally, one needs to understand the processes which bring about rationality, and learning processes and processes of evolution are among these processes. In Section III I shall illustrate by means of examples how research on learning and evolution can illuminate empirical observations concerning the rationality of behaviour.
T'he issue of rationality or irrationality of individuals' behaviour which I put at the centre of my argument is, however, not the issue on which the recent literature on learning and evolution has focused. Rather, it has given most attention to the problem of equilibrium selection in games. In Section IV I shall suggest that this has been a mistake. I have three arguments for this. First, the question of when rationality comes about logically precedes the question of equilibrium selection. Second, from an empirical point of view, the question on which I suggest focusing is the more urgent question. Finally, the chances of making substantial progress with the equilibrium selection question appear to be relatively small as compared to the chances of making progress with the question on which I suggest focusing.
Section IV will contain a second point of criticism of the recent literature. It is that the literature has made too much use of evolutionary models taken from biology. If used in economics, such models must be interpreted as reduced forms of learning and imitation models. I shall argue that the most popular evolutionary models can indeed be interpreted in such a way, but that this interpretation relies on very special learning models. There are many other learning models which appear equally plausible, and which are not equivalent to biological models.
The two criticisms of the recent literature on learning and evolution in Section IV form the second step of the main arguments of this paper. The paper is concluded with brief remarks in Section V.
I. RATIONALITY
The idea on which economic theory tries to base its explanation of human behaviour is that human behaviour can be interpreted as the solution of an optimisation problem. Where such an interpretation is possible, economists say that human behaviour is 'rational'. Since the literature which will be discussed in this essay is concerned with the question how economic agents come to behave 'rationally', it is useful to begin by considering in more detail the meaning of the rationality assumption in economics.
Economists' use of the world 'rational' is different from the everyday use of this word. In everyday language, 'rational' means something like 'based on careful thought'. In economics, however, any behaviour that solves some optimisation problem is called 'rational', independent of whether it comes about as the result of careful thought, or whether it comes about through tradition, routine, or in any other way. All that matters is the behaviour's actual optimality. In the words of Herbert Simon, economists' notion of [SEPTEMBER rationality is one of'substantive rationality', not of 'procedural rationality' (Simon, 1955) .
The economists' attempt to explain actual behaviour as 'rational' behaviour is comparable to a method used by many empirical sciences which explain observed phenomena by interpreting them as the solution of some optimisation problem. For example, the shape of the bubbles formed by soapy water constitutes the solution of some optimisation problem.T he argument made in the preceding paragraphs may appear obvious, however it was worth reiterating because comments of the following type are still common, even among sophisticated economists: 'If this optimisation problem is so complicated that even a theorist can not solve it explicitly, how dare you assume that economic agents will solve it?' Notice that a similar objection could be raised against the claim that soapy water solves optimisation problems. The weakness of the argument is obvious in that context, and the argument is similarly weak in the context of economics. The mistake in that argument is that it is based on the implicit assumption that rationality requires economic agents to solve optimisation problems consciously. Arguments of the type just discussed are often used to motivate interest in models of non-rational behaviour. There are good reasons for such interest, but this particular argument is bad. It confuses rather than clarifies the issues which are at stake.
It is not universally accepted that the rationality hypothesis is an empirical postulate. It has been argued that it is obvious that economic agents are never perfectly rational, and that the study of models with rational agents is a pure thought experiment without any claims to empirical relevance. By implication, this argument dismisses the larger body of research in economics as pure play of thoughts. This would be a very sad state of affairs. However, there is no reason why one should adopt this view without checking the data. If rationality is unsuitable as an empirical theory, this will be borne out by the facts. As will be explained below, the facts do not lead to this unambiguous verdict about the rationality hypothesis.
There are limitations to the analogy drawn above between soapy water and economic agents. One important such limitation stems from the fact that all soapy waters maximise the same function when forming bubbles, whereas the same cannot be said of economic agents. Economists call the function which an agent's behaviour maximises the agent's 'utility function', and they allow for the possibility that different agents' utility functions differ.
If no assumptions are made with respect to the form of the utility function, then the rationality hypothesis has no empirical implications. Everything maximises something.^ Sometimes it is argued that the 'Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference' is an empirical implication of rationality alone, without any assumption regarding the form of the utility function. However, thê
The relevant optimisation problem is known as 'Plateau's Problem'. The optimisation problem, and its relevance to soap film experiments, is described in Chapter VII, § 11 of Courant and Robbins (1941) . I would like to thank Christoph BOrgers for this reference. Rust's (1994) Lemma 3.2 is a formal and more sophisticated version of this observation in the context of dynamic programming problems.
'Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference' implicitly presumes that it is possible to observe agents making several choices in independent choice situations, and this independence assumption is an implicit assumption regarding preferences.
The fact that the rationality hypothesis is empirically empty if no assumptions are made with respect to the utility function, does not necessarily imply that the hypothesis is without practical use. The purpose of the rationality hypothesis could be to provide a framework in which economists can organise observations. An economist using this framework would 'understand' an agent's observed behaviour by identifying an optimisation problem which it solves.
I do not think, however, that this position is tenable. Every observed behaviour can be rationalised by the utility function which assigns utility one to the action chosen by the agent, and utility zero to all alternatives. Nothing can be learned from rationalising agents' behaviour in this way.
Instead, I want to favour the approach which combines the rationality hypothesis with ad hoc assumptions regarding the form of agents' utility function. Typical assumptions regarding the form of utility functions are, for example, that in decisions under risk the utility function is ofthe von Neumann Morgenstern-form, that in intertemporal decisions the utility function is intertemporally separable, or that in decisions involving money an agent's utility function is monotonically increasing in money. These assumptions seem plausible to me, but they need not seem plausible to someone else. They are admittedly ad hoc, but then: 'Everybody who ever tried to model individual behaviour knows that it is impossible to avoid a priori assumptions completely' (Hildenbrand, 1994, p. 14) .* If the rationality assumption is combined with assumptions regarding the form of the utility function, then the combined hypothesis, though not the rationality hypothesis alone, can be confirmed or rejected by the data. Empirical work will not lead us to an unambiguous verdict regarding agents' rationality, but it will tell us whether it is easy or difficult to rationalise economic agents' behaviour.
If we find it difficult to rationalise economic agents' behaviour, then we can build more and more sophisticated optimisation models to account for the observed behaviour. However, at some point it will be more simple and more plausible to adopt the hypothesis that the agent's behaviour is 'irrational'. It will, of course, be a matter of judgement when this point is reached. Once it is reached, it is appropriate to say that the rationality hypothesis has 'failed'. In the following section, I shall consider whether, in this sense, the rationality hypothesis has, in practice, failed, or whether it has been successful.
II. EVIDENCE
The rationality hypothesis in economics has been the subject of much philosophical debate. However, before entering into such debates, it is better to check the facts, and ask how well the rationality hypothesis does in practice. This is the question which I address in this section.
* Although this quotation seems to support my argument in principle, it should be emphasised that in practice Hildenbrand is much less willing to accept ad hoc assumptions regarding utility functions than I am.
Unfortunately, there are no striking examples of empirical regularities which are well explained by the rationality hypothesis. One would call an example 'striking' if it were as impressive as some of the examples in other sciences where observed phenomena have been explained as the solutions to optimisation problems. For example, the explanation of the shape of bubbles formed by soapy water as the solution to an optimisation problem is, in this sense, 'striking'. What makes this example 'striking' is that it involves a very well-established empirical regularity, that the explanation is non-obvious, and that the explanation allows to make extremely accurate predictions. Economists, it seems to me, have nothing of similar attraction to offer when it comes to explaining human behaviour.Ô f course, this does not imply that the rationality hypothesis has not had its empirical successes. Even a superficial reading.of the empirical evidence shows that there is indeed some observed behaviour which is easy to rationalise. But other observed behaviour is more difficult to rationalise, and sometimes sensible rationalisations are almost impossible.
For example, the way in which consumers divide their consumption expenditures between different groups of commodities is easy to rationalise. Somewhat more difficult to rationalise appears to be the decision about the total size of consumption expenditure (as opposed to savings). Also more difficult to rationalise seem to be consumers' decisions how to invest that part of their income that they have decided to save. Almost impossible to rationalise are some of the data collected in the laboratory by researchers conducting decision-theoretic experiments. The most classic example are 'preference reversals'. If we accept that Morgenstern and von Neumann's independence axiom is a necessary condition for rationality, then also the Allais paradox falls into the category of observations which are almost impossible to rationalise.* The evidence quoted so far has been evidence concerning single-person decision problems. The situation regarding strategic situations, i.e. games, reinforces the view that the rationality hypothesis is only partially confirmed. As a simple example consider bidding behaviour in auctions. Depending on the type of auction, both experimental and field evidence suggests that in some types of auctions the predictions of the rationality hypothesis are verified. In some other types of auctions, however, even experienced bidders systematically deviate from the predictions based on rationality. This occurs even in auctions in which bidders have dominant strategies. Such bidders' behaviour is almost impossible to rationalise.'
The view of the evidence which I have just suggested is not shared by everyone. Economists often have very strong feelings regarding the empirical ' John Rust's (1987) rationalisation ofthe engine replacement decisions of Harold Zurcher, a middle ranked manager in a Wisconsin bus company, is my leading candidate for a paper which one could recommend to a non-economist who is interested in economists' approach to behaviour, and it satisfies several of my criteria for 'striking' examples. The drawback is that it concerns only one individual. Related examples are described in Rust (1994) .
' Evidence justifying the empirical claims of this paragraph is described in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , Deaton (1992) , Rust (1994), and Camerer (1995) .
' Evidence justifying the empirical claims of this paragraph is described in Kagel (1995) and in other chapters of Roth and Kagel (1995) . validity of the rationality hypothesis. These feelings can go into either direction. Economists seem to divide into 'pro-' and 'contra-rationahty' factions.
Some authors when describing the empirical evidence focus strongly on violations of the rationality hypothesis. As an example consider Camerer's recent survey of experimental evidence regarding single person decision theory (Camerer, 1995) . This survey focuses almost exclusively on 'anomalies', i.e. deviations from rationality. Camerer motivates this focus by arguing that 'judgement errors might reveal how people generally make judgements, just as optical illusions tell us about perception, and forgetting tells us about memory' (Camerer, 1995, p. 588 ). I am not convinced by this argument. For the study of 'anomalies' to be useful we surely must know the circumstances under which they arise. We can know these circumstances, however, only if we also know the circumstances under which 'normal' behaviour can be expected. This applies to economic behaviour as well as to perception and memory. The only difference is that in the case of perception and memory everyday experience makes it rather obvious when 'normal' behaviour can be expected, whereas in the typical situations of relevance to economics it is by no means obvious under which circumstances agents will behave 'rationally'.
The other side of the argument is often represented by hard-line economists who try to downplay evidence which is difficult to rationalise by arguing that it results from circumstances in which decisionmakers did not have sufficiently large incentives to behave rationally, or in which they did not have sufficient opportunity to learn how to behave rationally, and that such evidence is not really worth considering. These researchers' main concern is then to 'improve' experimental setups until they obtain data which confirm the rationality hypothesis. I do not think, however, that the data, for example those concerning auctions which were quoted earlier, confirm the view that non-rational behaviour only arises in the circumstances described.* The extreme views held by some economists lead, in my opinion, to spurious confrontations. They might also distract attention from the more important question what it is that leads to observed behaviour sometimes being easy to rationalise, and sometimes being almost impossible to rationalise. This is the question to which the next section is devoted.
III. LEARNING
Given that the evidence regarding the rationalisability of observed behaviour is clearly mixed, it is important to know what distinguishes those situations in which agents' behaviour is easy to rationalise from those in which that is difficult or impossible. In order to be able to formulate hypotheses about the characteristics of situations in which economic agents' behaviour is easy, difficult or impossible to rationalise, we need a theoretical framework which ' I also disagree with the suggestion that we need not worry about behaviour that is observed in the described circumstances. At the aggregate level ofthe economy decisions which involve low stakes, or which are based on little experience, probably have a large impact. It would hence surely be worthwhile to discover regularities of decision making under these circumstances.
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[SEPTEMBER describes how rationality comes about. Following Binmore (1987) we can distinguish two types of theories. Firstly, agents might achieve rationality through careful thought about the situation at hand. Secondly, agents might follow simple learning rules which lead to rationality provided that the same situation is repeated sufficiently often. The current literature places much emphasis on very naive learning models. Theories which attribute to agents the ability of sophisticated reasoning are out of fashion. However, in practice both types of theories are probably important. In particular, in unfamiliar situations in which the stakes are high, decision makers seem to make big efforts trying to understand the situation in which they are called upon to act. Personally, I believe that current fashion probably undervalues what Binmore (1987) called 'eductive' theories of rationality.
Of course, I do not deny that learning also plays an important role in practice. In fact, there is clear empirical evidence that agents who are repeatedly confronted with the same decision situation change their behaviour over time.® Indeed, as indicated in the Introduction, I shall focus in the following exclusively on learning processes as a means of generating rationality.
A very large variety of learning processes have by now been studied in the literature. It is common to almost all of these learning processes that they predict that economic agents will achieve rationality in some, but by no means in all situations, even if they are given the opportunity to gather experience. Typically, this depends on the characteristics of the decision problem or game at hand. For example, if the relevant situation is a game, it often matters whether this game is 'dominance solvable'.^" If the relevant situation is a single-person decision problem, then many learning processes trivially predict that decision makers will always reach rational decisions, provided only that the situation is sufficiently stationary. However, more recent research has also uncovered plausible looking learning processes for which this is not true. One example (Lettau and Uhlig, 1993) will be discussed below. Related learning processes are studied in Borgers and Sarin (i993> 1995)- The point just discussed matters for the following argument which is one of the main claims of the paper. The literature on learning and evolution can provide a theoretical framework in which to develop hypotheses about when experienced agents will behave in an easy-to-rationalise manner, and when even experienced agents' behaviour will be difficult or impossible to rationalise. This is possible because learning models predict that agents will sometimes, but not always achieve rationality.
To illustrate what I had in mind, I shall discuss two recent papers on learning. The first paper. Roth and Erev (1995) , starts from the observation that there are some extensive form games in which even experienced subjects consistently deviate in experiments from the predictions of rationality, whereas in some other extensive form games experiment subjects learn to play rational° For evidence of learning in experiments see, for example, Roth and Erev (1995) . Note that there is also interesting evidence of experiment subjects' refusal to learn; see Kagel (1995, p. 557) .
'" See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1991) .
Strategies. The paper than describes a simple learning model which matches well the learning behaviour which was observed in the relevant experiments, and which can be used to explain why rationality was achieved in some games and not in others. The second paper, Lettau and Uhlig (1993) , takes its motivation from field data, not from experimental data. It starts from the observation that households' consumption expenditure appears to respond more strongly to transitory income changes than would be optimal in a simple life-cycle model of consumption and saving.'^^ The paper then develops a learning model for intertemporal decision problems. This learning model predicts that optimal decision rules will sometimes, but not always be learned. The authors argue that decisions about consumption expenditure may be in the class of situations in which optimal decision rules will not be learned.
The two papers discussed above indicate how research on learning can help to understand the rationality or irrationality of observed economic behaviour. Further research along these lines seems to me promising. Such research can lead to interesting interactions between theoretical, experimental, and econometric research.
To avoid misunderstanding, I should add that I expect that the suggested research programme can clarify only some, but not all of the evidence concerning the question when rational behaviour comes about. This is because there are mechanisms other than learning, in particular' eductive' mechanisms, which might bring about rationality.
I want to conclude this section with a comment on the theoretical side of research on learning. There is a plethora of conceivable learning models, and one may wonder how theoretical researchers should choose their focus. The obvious answer appears to be that attention should be restricted to those models which have been empirically successful. I want to argue in favour of an approach which is more open minded than this answer suggests. The empirical evidence regarding rationality in decision problems and games is still very incomplete. Further evidence needs to be collected. It would be dangerous to commit prematurely to a too narrow class of learning models. A more fruitful approach for theoreticians is to identify different categories of learning rules, and to try to find properties which learning rules in the same category share.^^I V. CRITIQUE The purpose ofthe previous section was to argue that research on learning and evolution can make an important contribution to economics. In this section I want to discuss two problems which, in my opinion, affiict this literature in its current form. These problems reduce the contribution which the literature makes to economics. The first problem is that the literature relies too strongly " Lettau and Uhlig refer to aggregate rather than micro data. Whether micro data also exhibit excess sensitivity is not clear; see, for example, Deaton (1992) .
'^ A broad classification of learning rules which I find very useful has been proposed by Selten (1991, p. 14) . on evolutionary metaphors. The second problem is that the literature places too much emphasis on the question of equilibrium selection in games.
A large part of the recent literature on dynamic processes employs evolutionary models. Authors use equilibrium notions such as John Maynard Smith's (1982) 'evolutionary stable strategies' and dynamic processes such as Taylor and Jonker's (1978) 'replicator dynamics'^*'^*. These concepts have been developed to model the evolution of animal behaviour, and they are based on the assumption that behaviour is determined by genes, and that Darwinian mutation and selection mechanisms determine which behaviour genes survive.
In economics these concepts can only be understood metaphorically, not literally. This is probably uncontroversial, but it might be worthwhile to recapitulate the argument for this. The argument is not that human behaviour is essentially different from other animals' behaviour and that it is not genetically determined. Rather, the crucial point is that it is not practically feasible today to derive predictions of human behaviour by appealing to its genetic determination. Scientific understanding ofthe relation between human genes and human behaviour seems in its beginnings. Moreover, the way in which genetic codes determine behaviour seems very complicated. Genetic codes seem to endow human beings with programmes which interact with the environment, and it is only this interaction which determines ultimately behaviour. Finally, the adaptation of human genes appears to occur so slowly that predictions which rely on this mechanism appear to be problematic.
For an understanding of human behaviour it seems more promising to regard the human genetic code as given, and to investigate the learning processes which take place in an individual's lifetime. These learning processes are more easily observable, and operate much faster than changes in genetic predisposition. If evolutionary ideas are then to be useful in economics it must be the case that learning processes operate in analogy to evolutionary processes.
One possibility of such an analogy was suggested by Richard Dawkins (1976) who argued that ideas could spread in a population of humans through a process of cultural evolution which acts much like biological evolution. Dawkins coined the expression 'memes' for ideas which were subject to such a process. In our context, it is natural to think of rules of economic behaviour as 'memes'. One can then regard recent work of Karl Schlag (1993) as a formalisation of Dawkins' idea in the context of economics. Schlag considers a population of individuals all of whom face the same decision problem or game. Individuals can observe other individuals' actions and payoffs. Schlag shows that, if agents follow some specific stochastic imitation rule, the resulting population dynamics is similar to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology.
" In the following 'replicator dynamics' will be referred to frequently. It is not necessary, however, for the reader to know the details of this process. Roughly speaking, replicator dynamics is a gradual process in which strategies which perform worse than the average become less frequent and strategies which perform better than the average become more frequent. Replicator dynamics reflect this principle using a very specific functional form.
'* Evidence ofthe emphasis on these notions is, for example, WeibuU's (1995) book, and the literature surveyed therein.
Schlag's result is, however, very fragile. It requires very specific imitation behaviour, and the analogy between imitation and evolution according to replicator dynamics breaks down if individuals adopted other imitation rules. In fact, my own calculations suggest that quite plausible imitation rules lead to population dynamics which are not only different from replicator dynamics, but different from any process with a biological interpretation of which I can think.^^ Moreover, I can see no empirical evidence to suggest that the imitation rules required for the analogy with replicator dynamics, or some other biological process, are more realistic than others.^* It may be worthwhile at this point to note the scepticism with which John Maynard Smith regards the idea that the spread of'memes' in a population is analogous to biological evolution. Most recently, this scepticism was expressed in Maynard Smith (1995, p. 47 
):
My uneasiness with the notion of memes arises because we do not know the rules whereby they are transmitted. A science of population genetics is possible because the laws of transmission -Mendel's laws -are known.
[... ] no comparable science of memetics is as yet possible.
There is another possible interpretation of evolutionary models in economics. Suppose we consider not a population of individuals, but focus on just one individual. It is sometimes argued that the process of trial and error learning which individuals use to search for good behaviour rules may be analogous to an evolutionary process. Maynard Smith (1995, p. 46) , for example, quotes this idea (approvingly). This idea has recently been formalised by Sarin (1993, 1995) who show that there are indeed formal relations between stochastic learning theories developed by psychologists in the 1950s and the rephcator dynamic of evolutionary biology. However, the result is again rather fragile. A very specific, and not necessarily the most realistic, learning model needs to be assumed for the result to be true. If quite plausible alternative learning dynamics are considered, the resulting process has much less close relations to the replicator process of evolutionary biology, or other processes with evolutionary interpretation.
To summarise, 'evolutionary' models in economics are thus not more than reduced versions of special learning models. The current state ofthe literature does not provide reasons for believing that those learning models which exhibit similarities to evolutionary models are of greater empirical importance than those which do not. I do not see good reasons to give special attention to 'evolutionary' models.
The second critical remark which I want to make about the literature on learning and evolution concerns the amount of attention which is given to the question of equilibrium selection.^' The question of equilibrium selection arises only in contexts in which rationality models predict well. If single person decision problems are considered the rational strategy will typically be unique.
" The reader should, of course, bear in mind that my knowledge of evolutionary biology is very limited. " Schlag does, however, provide axiomatic arguments for the imitation rules which he considers. " See, for example, Kandori et al. (1993) and Swinkels (1993) . However, in games there are often many outcomes in which all agents behave individually rationally, i.e. there are many 'Nash equihbria'. Hence, once one has identified circumstances in which the rationality hypothesis is empirically valid, one can ask the additional question whether there are empirical regularities in the selection of equilibria. Learning or evolutionary models can provide the theoretical framework for understanding this question.^* From a theoretical point of view, it is, of course, easy to understand why researchers have a special interest in questions of equilibrium selection. The problem of multiplicity of equilibria has proved a decisive obstacle to the analysis of many models of great economic interest, such as signalling models.
In my opinion theoreticians should, however, give higher priority to the question of when rationality comes about. This is because it is the logically prior question. Also, chances of obtaining results which apply to large classes of games seem to be higher with this question than with the equilibrium selection question, where most known results apply to very special games only.
Perhaps most importantly, I think that the literature on learning and evolution needs to adopt a more empirical perspective. From this point of view the question of equilibrium selection is oflower priority than the question when rationality hypothesis predicts well. There is at the moment relatively little empirical evidence concerning equilibrium selection.^" The larger part of the empirical literature deals with the question whether agents' behaviour can be explained by the rationality hypothesis at all. As it is desirable that the learning literature addresses issues regarding which empirical evidence exists, a focus on the conditions under which optimality arises is more appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to argue that research on learning and social evolution can help to understand the empirical scope of the rationality hypothesis. It was argued that there is evidence which is well explained by the rationality hypothesis, but that there is also significant evidence of behaviour that is difficult to rationalise, and that is probably better understood if interpreted as 'non-rational' behaviour. Research on learning and social evolution can help to understand what determines which behaviour is observed in practice.
Despite this, the current research effort on learning and evolution is regarded with some scepticism by economists outside the field. This paper has suggested that one reason for this might be the fact that the literature on learning and evolution has chosen a somewhat misguided focus. There are, however, other possible reasons. One is that economists naturally do not welcome research which calls into question the foundations of their work. Another is that even open minded economists are often impatient, and easily become sceptical if applicable results are not obtained quickly. I hope that researchers interested '* This was first suggested by Binmore (1987) . '° Some evidence does, of course, exist. An interesting analysis of this evidence from the point of view of learning is given by Crawford (1995). in learning and social evolution will not let themselves be discouraged by these facts.
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